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1 ‎[1] This indicates that if the skilled laborer said only: **I completed** the work with **it,** he is considered **a paid bailee,** i.e., even after he completes the work the item remains within his responsibility. The Gemara rejects this line of reasoning: **No,** this is not what should be deduced from the mishna. Rather, the correct deduction is that one who says: **Give money** first **and** then **take** what is **yours,** is **a paid bailee.**

‎[2] The Gemara asks: **But** if that is the case, when one says only: **I completed** the work with **it, what** is the *halakha*? Is he considered **an unpaid bailee? If so, rather than teaching** a new *halakha* in the mishna: **And all those who say: Take** what is **yours and bring money,** each of them is considered **an unpaid bailee, let it teach us** instead the *halakha* of one who says: **I completed** the work with **it, and** it can be deduced that **all the more so** is this the *halakha* if he says to him: **Take** what is **yours.**

‎[3] The Gemara rejects this line of reasoning: The case of **take** what is **yours must** be taught explicitly. Otherwise, it might **enter your mind to say** that once he issues this statement, **he is not** considered **even an unpaid bailee** and retains no responsibility whatsoever for the item. Therefore, the mishna **teaches us** that even in this case he is still considered an unpaid bailee and continues to bear certain responsibilities.

‎[4] **There are** those **who say** that there is a different version of this discussion. Rather than challenging that Rav Ḥisda’s opinion is opposed by the ruling of the mishna, **Rav Naḥman bar Pappa said: We, too, learn** a proof for Rav Ḥisda’s statement from the mishna: **And all those who say: Take** what is **yours and bring money,** each of them is considered **an unpaid bailee. What, is it not** correct to say that **the same is true** when he says: **I have completed** the work with **it?** The Gemara rejects this claim. **No,** the case of one who says **take** what is **yours is different,** as stated above, as one might think that this statement frees the laborer of all responsibility.

‎[5] The Gemara cites a third version of this discussion. **Huna Mar bar Mareimar raised a contradiction between the *mishnayot* before Ravina and resolved** it himself. **We learned** in the mishna: **And all those who say: Take** what is **yours and bring money,** each of them is considered **an unpaid bailee. And** apparently **the same is true for** one who said: **I completed** the work with **it. And** Huna Mar bar Mareimar **raises a contradiction** from the aforementioned mishna: If the **borrower said to** the lender: **Send** the animal to me, **and he sent it** to him **and it died** on the way, the borrower is **liable, and similarly when he returns it. And** he **resolves this** contradiction in accordance with that which **Rafram bar Pappa said** that **Rav Ḥisda said: They taught** this *halakha* **only when he returned it during the period of its loan. But** if he returned it **after the period of its loan, he is exempt.**

‎[6] § **A dilemma was raised before** the Sages: When Rav Ḥisda said that a borrower who returned the item after the period of the loan is exempt, is he **exempt** only **from** the strict obligations of **a borrower, but** he remains **liable as a paid bailee, or perhaps he is also not** liable as **a paid bailee? Ameimar said: It stands to reason** that he is **exempt as a borrower but** is still **liable as a paid bailee.** Ameimar’s reasoning is that **since** he previously **had benefit, he** must **provide benefit** in return, by safeguarding the item as a paid bailee until the item reaches the owner’s possession.

‎[7] **It is taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Bava Batra* 6:5) **in accordance with** the opinion of **Ameimar:** With regard to **one who takes vessels from an artisan’s house to send them** as a gift **to his father-in-law’s house, and** he **said to** the artisan: **If they accept them from me** as a gift **I will give you the money for them, and if not,** i.e., if they return the gift, **I will give you** money **in accordance with the financial advantage** I received **from them,** i.e., I will pay you the benefit that I accrued through their knowledge that I tried to send them a gift; **and an accident happened** to the vessels and they were broken, if this incident occurred **on their way** to the recipient the customer is **liable.**

‎[8] If they broke **on the way back** he is **exempt, because he is like a paid bailee,** who is not liable for accidents. If this individual, who pays for the financial advantage he received, is considered a paid bailee, all the more so should this apply to a borrower who returned the item after the period of the loan, in accordance with the opinion of Ameimar, as he did not offer to pay anything.

‎[9] The Gemara relates: There was **a certain man who sold a donkey to another.** The buyer **said to him: I will bring it to such and such a place; if it is sold,** well and **good; and if not, I will return it to you. He went and it was not sold, and on his way** back the donkey was injured in **an accident.** The case **came before Rav Naḥman,** who **deemed** the buyer **liable** to pay.

‎[10] **Rabba raised an objection to Rav Naḥman** from the *baraita*: If **an accident happened to** the vessels **on their way** to the recipient, the customer is **liable;** if they broke **on the way back** he is **exempt, because he is like a paid bailee.** If so, why did you deem this buyer liable, when the accident occurred on his return?

‎[11] Rav Naḥman **said to** Rabba that there is a difference between the cases, as **the way back of this** one **is** considered **like the way** to the recipient. **What is the reason** for this? It **is** based on **logical reasoning:** Even **on his way back, if he found** an opportunity **to sell** the donkey, **wouldn’t he have sold it?** Therefore, as he was in possession of the animal the entire time, the *halakha* treats his going and returning equally, and he retains the responsibility of a borrower until he actually returns the animal to its owner.

‎[12] § The mishna teaches: With regard to one who says to another: **Safeguard** my property **for me and I will safeguard** your property **for you,** each of them is a **paid bailee.** The Gemara asks: **But why** is this the *halakha*? **It is** a case of **safeguarding with the owners.** There is a principle that a bailee is exempt from paying for the damage if the owner of the item is present with the bailee or in his employ when he is safeguarding the item. **Rav Pappa said:** The mishna means that **he said to him: Safeguard** my property **for me today and I will safeguard** your property **for you tomorrow.** At the time of his safeguarding, the owner was not in the bailee’s employ.

‎[13] **The Sages taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta* 7:10): If one said: **Safeguard** my property **for me and I will safeguard** your property **for you,** or: **Lend** money **to me and I will lend** money **to you,** or: **Safeguard** my property **for me and I will lend** money **to you,** or: **Lend** money **to me and I will safeguard** your property **for you, they all become paid bailees for each other.** The Gemara asks: **Why** are they liable as paid bailees? **Is** this not a situation of **safeguarding with the owners? Rav Pappa** again **said:** This is referring to a case **where he said to him: Safeguard** my property **for me today and I will safeguard** your property **for you tomorrow.**

‎[14] The Gemara relates: There were **certain ice plant dealers [*ahaluyei*],** and **every day one** of them **would** have a turn to **bake** for the group. **One day** the others **said to one of them: Go** and **bake for us. He said to them: Safeguard my cloak for me. Before he came** back **they were negligent with it and it was stolen. They came** for judgment **before Rav Pappa,** and he **deemed them liable** to pay for the cloak.

‎[15] **The Rabbis said to Rav Pappa: Why** did you deem them liable to pay? **This is** akin to a case of **negligence** by a bailee while he is **with the owners,** as the owner of the cloak was baking for them at the time the cloak was stolen due to their negligence. Rav Pappa **was embarrassed** over his apparent mistake. **Ultimately, it was discovered that at that time,** when the cloak was stolen, the cloak owner **was drinking beer** and not baking. Since he was not doing work for them, this was not a case of safeguarding with the owner, and therefore Rav Pappa’s ruling was vindicated.

‎[16] The Gemara comments: **This works out well according to the one who says** that in a case of **negligence** by a bailee while he is **with the owners** he is **exempt; due to that** reason Rav Pappa **was embarrassed. But according to the one who says** that in a case of negligence he is **liable** even while he is with the owners, **why was** Rav Pappa **embarrassed? Rather,** this is what actually happened: **That day was not his** turn to bake, **and they said to him: You go** and **bake for us, and he said to them: As payment for baking for you** when it is not my turn, **safeguard my cloak.** In other words, they were paid bailees.

2 ‎[1] **Before he came** back **it was stolen. They came before Rav Pappa,** who **deemed them liable** to pay. **The Sages said to Rav Pappa: This is** a case of **safeguarding with the owners.** Rav Pappa **was embarrassed. Ultimately it was discovered that at that time** the cloak owner **was drinking beer** and not baking, and therefore this was not a case of safeguarding with the owners.

‎[2] The Gemara relates: An incident occurred with **these two** people **who were going on the way, one** of whom was **tall and one** of whom was **short. The tall one was riding on a donkey and he had a sheet. The short one was covered with** a woolen **cloak [*sarbela*] and was walking on foot. When** the short one **reached a river, he took his cloak and placed it on the donkey** in order to keep the cloak dry, **and he took that** tall man’s **sheet and covered himself with it,** and **the water washed away his sheet.**

‎[3] The tall man **came** for judgment **before Rava,** who **deemed** the short man liable to pay for the sheet. **The Rabbis said to Rava: Why** did you deem him liable to pay? **This is** a case of **borrowing with the owners** present. Rava **was embarrassed. Ultimately, it was discovered that** the short man **took** the sheet **without** the tall man’s **knowledge and placed it** back **without his knowledge,** and therefore this was not borrowing, but theft.

‎[4] The Gemara relates that there was **a certain man who rented a donkey to another.** The owner **said to** the renter: **Look, do not go on the path of Nehar Pekod, where there is water** and the donkey is likely to drown. Instead, **go on the path of Neresh, where there is no water.** The renter **went on the path of Nehar Pekod and the donkey died. When he came** back, **he said: Yes, I went on the path of Nehar Pekod; but there was no water** there, and therefore the donkey’s death was caused by other factors.

‎[5] **Rava said:** The renter’s claim is accepted, due to the reasoning of: **Why should he lie?** In other words, **if** this man **wanted** to lie, **he** could have **told** the donkey’s owner: **I went on the path of Neresh,** as the owner instructed. **Abaye said to** Rava: **We do not say** the principle of: **Why would I lie, in a place** where there are **witnesses.** Since witnesses can be summoned to establish conclusively whether there was water along the path of Nehar Pekod, the reasoning that the renter could have stated a different claim is not employed.

‎[6] § The mishna teaches that if one says to another: **Safeguard** my property **for me, and** the other **says to him: Place** it **before me,** the second individual is **an unpaid bailee. Rav Huna said:** If the second individual **said to him: Place** it down **before yourself, he is neither an unpaid bailee nor a paid bailee,** and he has no responsibility at all. **A dilemma was raised before** the Sages: If he said simply: **Place** it down, **without specifying** further, **what** is the *halakha*? The Gemara attempts to provide an answer from the mishna. **Come** and **hear:** If one says to another: **Safeguard** my property **for me, and** the other **says to him: Place** it **before me,** the second individual is **an unpaid bailee.** This indicates that **an unspecified** statement is **nothing.**

‎[7] The Gemara rejects this inference: **On the contrary,** one can infer the opposite **from** that **which Rav Huna says:** If the second individual said to him: **Place** it down **in front of yourself,** it is in this case **that he is neither an unpaid bailee nor a paid bailee.** This indicates that if he said simply: **Place** it down, **without specifying** further, **he is an unpaid bailee. Rather, no** inference is **to be learned from this** mishna, as the inferences are contradictory concerning this *halakha*.

‎[8] The Gemara suggests: **Let us say** that this matter **is the subject of** a dispute between ***tanna’im*,** as it was taught in a mishna (*Bava Kamma* 47b): **If one brought** his items into the courtyard of another **with the permission of the owner of the courtyard** and they were damaged there, the owner of the courtyard is **liable. Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **says: In all** cases **he is liable only if the owner** of the courtyard explicitly **accepts upon himself to safeguard** the items. That mishna is apparently referring to one who places his items in a yard without specification, and the *tanna’im* disagreed on the question of liability; it therefore has a parallel application to the case in this mishna.

‎[9] The Gemara refutes this claim. **From where** do you know that these cases are parallel? **Perhaps the Rabbis there say** their opinion **only in a courtyard,** which **can be safeguarded, and** therefore **when** the owner of the courtyard allowed the other to bring his items into the courtyard and **said to him: Place** them in, what he was **saying to him** was: **Place** them in so **that I can safeguard it for you. But here,** in **a market,** which is a place where goods **cannot be safeguarded,** he was actually **saying to him: Place** it down **and sit** and **safeguard it yourself.**

‎[10] **Alternatively,** one can say the opposite: Perhaps **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **says** his ruling, that the owner of the courtyard is not liable, **only there, in his courtyard, as he requires permission from** the owner of the courtyard **to enter, and when** the owner of the courtyard **gave him permission to enter,** all **he said to him** was: **Sit and safeguard it. But here,** in the market, when he said to the owner of the item: Place it down, he was **saying to him: Place** it down **and I will safeguard** it **for you. As if it enters your mind** that he was **saying to him: Place** it down **and sit and safeguard it** yourself, **does** the owner of the item really **require permission from him to put** an item **down** in a public place? In light of these suggestions, there is not necessarily a connection between the two *mishnayot*.

‎[11] § The mishna teaches: **One who lent to** another based **on collateral** is **a paid bailee** for the collateral. The Gemara comments: **Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught** in a *baraita*: With regard to **one who lends to another** based **on collateral and the collateral was lost,** the lender **takes an oath** that he was not negligent in his safeguarding, **and** then **he** may **take his money** that he lent him. This is **the statement of Rabbi Eliezer,** who apparently maintains that the lender took the collateral as proof of the loan, and therefore he is considered an unpaid bailee, who is liable for negligence unless he takes an oath.

‎[12] The *baraita* continues: **Rabbi Akiva says** that the borrower can **say to him: Didn’t you lend to me only** based **on the collateral?** If **the collateral is lost, your money is lost.** In other words, the collateral was taken as security for the debt. **But** if **he lent him one thousand dinars by means of** a promissory **note and** the borrower **left him collateral against** the money, **everyone agrees** that if **the collateral is lost, his money is lost.** In this case it cannot be claimed that the collateral was held as proof of the debt, as there is a document attesting to the debt. Consequently, it was evidently taken as security corresponding to the loan, which means that if the collateral is lost, the lender loses his money.

‎[13] The Gemara refutes this suggestion: **Even** if **you say** that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer,** it is **not difficult. Here,** the *baraita* is referring to a case **where** the lender **took his collateral at the time of his loan,** and therefore the collateral served as proof of the loan, whereas **there,** the mishna is referring to a case **where** the lender **took his collateral** later, **not at the time of his loan,** to enhance his ability to collect payment. In this latter case, the collateral is clearly security for the money, and therefore he is considered a paid bailee.

Bava Metzia 81

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