COMMENTS ON DUALISM AND MATERIALISM

06.12.2020

by Alchemist <alchemist@sdf.org>

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Introduction

This post is mostly related to my reading of De ente et essentia, by St. Thomas Aquinas.

My main objective here is to say that the whole debate of materialism vs. dualism does not seem so fair when so many ways of thinking could fall under the idea of materialism. So I criticize Aquinas here and there, taking the opportunity to point other authors such as Spinoza for example.

Some of those parts have been translated from original Portuguese language, and some were rewritten to better fit this format or the English language.

1. The ideas of ente et essentia

Clearly, St. Thomas Aquinas drafts a dualistic view on this text, however such view still looks appropriate with respect to Aquinas's definition of essence and its fitness on natural substances. My research topics tend to a materialistic view, and that is a fact, but believe that the word "materialism" is loaded.

For example, it seems incorrect to say that something is a proper edifice if (and only if) it is made of bricks, cement, mortar, etc., given that this is an incomplete definition; effectively, to the essence of a proper edifice also belongs its civil and architectural projects, among other things.

In the same way, one cannot just say that the thoughts labeled as materialistic necessarily bases upon what is produced by matter, given that action – in the enactivist sense[1] – does not necessarily involve material backing, for example. Before that, action backs matter.

This is an interesting view to adopt, or so I think, especially from the perspective of Spinoza[2]'s ideas. As much as he preaches a self-contained view of the universe, giving it what seems to be a pertinent causal closure, labelling his philosophy as something that only concerns matter can be a huge mistake.

2. Aquinas's idea of individuals

I would like to address the ideas discussed on the 66th paragraph of De ente et essentia, which I'll type in verbatim below. It is in Brazillian Portuguese.

> E, por isso, não se encontra em tais substâncias uma multidão de indivíduos numa espécie, como foi dito, a não ser na alma humana, por causa do corpo ao qual está unida. E, embora sua individuação dependa ocasionalmente do corpo, no que diz respeito à sua incoação, pois não adquire para si um ser individuado, senão no corpo do qual é ato, no entanto não é preciso que, retirado o corpo, pereça a individuação. Pois, como tem ser absoluto, a partir do qual foi adquirido para si o ser individualizado, por causa do ter sido feita forma deste corpo, aquele ser permanece sempre individualizado. E, por isso, Avicena (De Anima, V, 3 e 4, 24b-c, B-C e 25a, B) diz que a individuação e multiplicação das almas depende do corpo, no que diz respeito ao seu princípio, mas não no que refere ao seu fim.

I'll provide a rough free translation to English now, but please mind that I am not a professional translator and that there might be some flaws:

> And, because of that, one cannot find in such substances a multitude of individuals in one species, as was said, but on the human soul, because of the body that it is bound to. And although its individuation depends occasionally on the body, with respect to its beginnings, for it does not acquire for itself an individuated being, but in the body for which it is act, however it is not needed that, removed the body, the individuation should perish. For as it has an absolute being, from which the individualized being was acquired for itself, because of having been made form of this body, that being remains always individualized. And, because of that, Avicenna (De Anima, V, 3 and 4, 24b-c, B-c and 25a, B) says that individuation and multiplication of souls depends on the body, with respect to its beginnings, but not with respect to its end.

Regarding this paragraph, I agreed in some parts and disagreed in others.

Aquinas's focus is on continued individuation based on separation of body and soul[3]. But I prefer to understand what is here called a "soul" in a somewhat different way, at least given this aspect of individuation[4]. In some literatures, the meanings of "mind" and "soul" are given as synonyms, and I would like to proceed with a satisfactory though on that same track, even if some might insist that these things and concepts remain separate, as if they had nothing to do with one another.

From here, it might be worth taking a look at the idea of "pure act" in other literatures, since Aquinas mentions it near paragraph 66 as well.

Footnotes

[1] For enactivists, everything is action. I cannot give better explanations on this right now, because I want to improve my knowledge on the thoughts of Maturana and Varela, but roughly speaking, even actors themselves could be considered the framing of specific actions given some context. This framing, however, is not arbitrary.

[2] I may talk about it here someday, but there are some thoughts on Spinoza's philosophy regarding the essence of Men and of the human mind, and also some comparisons that can be made between its philosophy and the idea of pantheism, which is wrongly attributed to his vision of God.

[3] Here I wanted to talk about the "soul" in Aquinas's own dualistic view of it: it is potence and the cause of volition.

[4] It would be interesting here to talk about the idea of the extended mind by Maturana and Varela, where the mind and the body are interdependent as one is also dependent on the other in the process of individuation, however I do not know what is said by them about what happens when the body itself perishes. Douglas Hofstadter's ideas, exposed on his book I am a Strange Loop, shed some light on it, as he states to Daniel Dennett, after the passing away of the latter's wife, that it seemed to him that one's "I" continued to live in different ways and strengths in other people's minds, said strength always related to how close one is of another. That also reminds me of Bakhtin's ideas, but perharps I should discuss this on another occasion.